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NOTES
Air Law
NAVIGABLE AIRSPACE - STATE JURISDICTION
COMPLAINTS OF LANDOWNERS ADJACENT TO AIRPORTS
Introduction
Major airlines have recently announced the placement of orders for
jet-powered commercial aircraft for use in the air transport service.
With these announcements, federal agencies and commissions, municipal
governments, and airline companies more actively considered the
multiple problems which the introduction of jet aircraft would bring
to the air transportation industry. One major concern has been the
anticipated effect of the noise emitted by the jet engine, not only upon
the passengers and crew, but upon the landowners in the suburban
communities adjacent to an airport.' Many nuisance cases have arisen in
the past wherein neighboring property owners and communities have
alleged the noise and low flights of propeller-driven aircraft in using a
nearby airport were an unreasonable interference with the use and en-
joyment of their land. Numerous similar complaints are expected when
jet transports commence to use these same airports.
The amplified and higher pitched sound emitted by the jet engines of
these airliners is expected to be objectionable to property owners not-
withstanding manufacturers' assurances that Noise-supressing devices will
be perfected before the airliners are delivered. The problem has reached
such proportions that in 1951 the New York Port Authority barred
aircraft driven by jet engines from all terminals under its jurisdiction
until the noise occasioned by the aircraft can be demonstrated not to
have a deleterious effect upon surrounding communities. 2
A second prominent concern is the knowledge that jet transports must
fly longer and shallower ffight patterns when landing or taking off than
propeller-driven aircraft.3 What will be the effect upon an adjacent land
owner of such flights? Cases are legion in which the allegation was made
that low flights by propeller-driven airplanes as they used an adjoining
airfield constituted a trespass to the landowner's property. Since these
high-speed jet transports will follow longer and shallower glide patterns
when approaching or leaving airports, bordering landowners who were
not previously affected can now be expected to take up the cry of tres-
pass.
Inasmuch as these complaints will be brought, for the most part, in
the state courts, it is the primary purpose of this Note to discuss the
power of these forums to afford relief to property owners affected by
the noise and low flight of a jet transport. But the federal government
plays the principal role in regulating commercial aviation; consequently,
1 Fraleigh & Goddard, Airport Planning and Management, 23 J. Am L. &
CoM. 160 (1956).
2 Goldstein, The Over-all Problem, 24 J. Am L. & Com. 172 (1957).
3 Ireland, Airport Problems of the Airlines, 23 . Am. L. & CoM. 12 (1956).
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the authority of state courts to grant appropriate relief must be viewed
against this background. Federal regulation in this area has been both
broad and sweeping, the result of which has been to sharpen the age-old
jurisdictional conflict between the state, which seeks to protect the citizen
in the full use and enjoyment of his property, and the federal government,
which recognizes the policy that public interest in commercial aviation
can best be served by a single regulating authority.
Federal Regulation of Air Commerce
Congress has the authority to legislate in matters of commerce extend-
ing over and through state boundaries as derived from the commerce
clause of the Constitution which provides that "The Congress shall have
Power. . .to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States .... 4 Clearly the air transport service involves interstate
commerce which Congress could regulate if it so desired. Pursuant to
this constitutional power, Congress delegated to the Civil Aeronautics
Board, by the Air Commerce Act of 1926,5 amended by the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938,6 the authority to regulate air commerce. The ex-
clusive authority to rule the airspace above the United States is declared
to be in the public domain. 7 Furthermore, any citizen of the United
States is recognized as having a public right of freedom of transit through
the navigable airspace.8 Additional provisions define air commerce as
encompassing all operations of aircraft flying in interstate or foreign
commerce, 9 and that " 'Navigable air space' means air space above the
minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations .... 10
To assist the Civil Aeronautics Board in providing for the safety and
protection of those engaged in air commerce, Congress specifically granted
the Board authority to provide rules and regulations for minimum alti-
tudes of flight so as to prevent colisions of aircraft either with the ground
or other aircraft." Under these provisions, the Board has prescribed
general flight rules for persons and aircraft employed in air commerce.
Foremost in importance is section 60.17 of the Civil Air Regulations
which establishes minimum safe altitudes of flight for all airplanes when
4 U. S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
44 STAT. 568 (1926), 49 U.S.C. § 171-246 (1952).
6 52 STAT. 973 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 401-722 (1952).
7 52 STAT. 1028 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 176 (a) (1952).
8 52 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 403 (1952).
9 52 STAT. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 401 (3) (1952).
'Air Commerce' means interstate, overseas, or foreign air comerce or the trans-
portation of mail by aircraft or any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly
affects, or which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air
commerce."
10 52 STAT. 979 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 401 (24) (1952).
11 52 STAT. 1008 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 551 (a) (1952).
"The Board is empowered, and it shall be its duty to promote safety of flight
in air commerce by prescribing and revising from time to time-
"(7) Air traffic rules governing the flight of, and for the navigation, protection,
and identification of, aircraft, including rules as to safe altitudes of flight and rules
for the prevention of collisions between aircraft, and between aircraft and land or
water vehicles."
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flying over land or water.12 This regulation serves a dual purpose. It is
obviously intended as a safety measure for pilot, crew, and passengers,
and for all beneath the air highway. However, for this discussion, its
importance lies in defining the downward extent of navigable airspace
over which the federal government has exclusive control since, by defini-
tion, the floor of the navigable airspace is contingent upon the determin-
ation of the minimum safe altitudes of flight. While this regulation specifi-
cally defines, in terms of "feet," the altitude an airplane must maintain
when over congested areas, sparsely settled areas, or water, it does not
similarly define in terms of "feet" the altitude an airplane must observe
when landing or taking off. 13 Thus the question arises as to the status of
an airplane engaged in these operations-is it within or without the
navigable airspace?
Minimum Safe Altitudes Regulation and Navigable Airspace
'There exists a division of "authority as to whether an airplane is
operating within the navigable airspace during the time it is making a
landing or taking off. When confronted with such a determination, a
state court will find it necessary to interpret the clause "Except when
necessary for take-off or landing," as used in section 60.17 of the Civil
Air Regulations; as indicated above, this regulation determines the down-
ward extent of the navigable airspace.
The Civil Aeronautics Board, which promulgated the regulation, has
interpreted it to mean that an airplane would be operating within the
navigable airspace when flying a normal and necessary path as it ap-
proaches or leaves the airport.14 When the regulation was issued, the
Board also stated its reasons for not establishing minimum safe altitudes
of flight to govern an airplane while landing or taking off. It was pointed
out that the angles of climb and descent will vary depending upon the
weather, the type of aircraft, and the nature of the terrain below. The
12 14 C.F.R. § 60.17 (1956). "Minimum safe altitudes. Except when necessary
for take-off or landing, no person shall operate an aircraft below the following
altitudes:
"(b) Over congested areas. Over the congested areas of cities, towns, or settlements,
or over an open-air assembly of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest
obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet from the aircraft....
"(c) Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above the surface,
except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In such event, the aircraft
shall not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle or
structure.. .."
13 See note 12 supra. Note the exclusion clause of this provision: "Except
when necessary for take-off or landing ...."
14 Civil Air Regs. Interpretation 1. 19 FED. REG. 4602-03 (1954).
"[T]he Board construes the words 'Except when necessary for take-off or landing.
no person shall operate an aircraft below the following altitudes' where such
words appear in § 60.17 of the Civil Air Regulations, as establishing a minimum
altitude rule of specific applicability to aircraft taking off and landing. It is a rule
based on the standard of necessity, and applies during every instant that the airplane
climbs after take-off and throughout its approach to land. Since this provision does
prescribe a series of mnium altitudes within the meaning of the act, it follows,
through the application of section 3 [Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938], that an air-
craft pursuing a normal and necessary flight path in climb after take-off or in
approaching to land is operating in the navigable airspace."
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Board was aided in its interpretation by the legislative history of the
Air Commerce Act of 1926 which clearly indicates Congress intended the
navigable airspace to extend downward to the ground surface at air-
ports.' 5
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the language in the reg-
ulation to mean that an airplane would not be operating within the
navigable airspace when landing or taking off.' 6 The Court reasoned
that the express wording of the regulation meant that the navigable
airspace extends downward only to the safe minimum altitudes of flight,
and since no minimum altitudes for landing or taking off were imposed
by any regulation of the Civil Aeronautics Board, an airplane must be
considered to be outside the navigable airspace at those times. 17
Conceivably, whether or not the court will afford the landowner relief
from low flights of jet transports may well depend upon which inter-
pretation of the regulation - that of the Supreme Court or that of the
Civil Aeronautics Board-the court adopts. As an example, assume a
state court found jet transports flew so low over adjoining land directly
beneath the pattern which the planes must follow when arriving or
departing from the airport that the flights ordinarily would have resulted
in a trespass or constituted a nuisance. If the court adopted the inter-
pretation of the Civil Aeronautics Board, i.e., that the jet transports would
have been operating within the navigable airspace during the time of land-
ing or take-off, provided they were pursuing a "normal and necessary
flight pattern," could the state court grant relief by enjoining similar
flights at the presently dangerous altitude over the land in the future?
Apparently, yes. But the answer is not without difficulty, for prior to con-
sideration of the substantive question, the court must first dispose of the
express statutory provision granting the federal government exclusive
control of the navigable airspace.' 8
15 H. R. REP. No. 1162, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1926).
"11. Navigable Airspace-The House Bill provides a public right of freedom
of interstate and foreign air navigation in the navigable airspace similar to the
public right of such navigation upon navigable waters. Such navigable airspace
comprises the airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the
Secretary of Commerce. These altitudes would vary with the terrene [sic] and location
of cities and would coincide with the surface of the land or water at airports. The
power to fix various altitudes was, therefore, left to the discretion of the Secretary
of Commerce, having regard to the above-mentioned and other relevant factors.
.. " (Emphasis added.)
16 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
17 "The path of glide governs the method of operating-of landing or taking
off. The altitude required for that operation is not the minimum safe altitude of
flight which is the downward reach of the navigable airspace.... [I]t is apparent
that the path of glide is not the minimum safe altitude of flight within the meaning
of the statute. The Civil Aeronautics Authority has, of course, the power to
prescribe air traffic rules. But Congress has defined navigable airspace only in terms
of one of them-the minimum safe altitudes of flight." Id. at 263-64.
18 44 STAT. 574 (1926), 49 U.S.C. § 180 (1952). "[T]he term 'navigable
airspace' means airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by
the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and such navigable airspace shall be subject to a
public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation .... "
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However, assuming the identical situation, if the court subscribed to
the interpretation of the Supreme Court, i.e., that the jet transports would
be operating without the navigable airspace during the time of these
flights, no such obstacle would be encountered inasmuch as the transports
would be traveling in airspace over which the federal government clearly
had not pre-empted regulation. 19
The remainder of this Note will be devoted to an examination
of the cases wherein the court was confronted with the decision whether
relief should be granted to property owners who sustained irreparable
injury occasioned by the repeated low flights of propeller-driven aircraft
while using an adjoining airport. The objective will be to determine the
manner in which the court treated the two opposing interpretations con-
cerning navigable airspace when confronted with allegations of nuisance,
trespass, or "taking."
Nuisance
Under the nuisance theory the landowner may allege generally that
his use and enjoyment of the land is interfered with to such a marked
degree, as a direct result of the repeated low flights over his land by
airplanes as they arrive or leave an adjoining airport, that the flights
constitute a nuisance at common law. He may ask either for damages or
an injunction restraining any future flights along the same glide pattern
or both. To support his allegation of interference with his use and enjoy-
ment of the land, he may attempt to show any or all of the following
conditions: that he suffers from the noise and vibration of low-flying
aircraft; that he suffers from the glare of landing lights at night; that
he is harassed by sleepless nights and nerve-shattering days; that normal
conversations within his house or over the telephone are impaired; that
his family lives in constant fear that the planes will crash into their home.
In Gardner v. County of Allegheny,20 a landowner asked the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania to find that the court below had power to enjoin
the repeated low flights of propeller-driven aircraft using an adjoining
airfield. After discussing the relative powers of the federal and state
governments, the true definition of navigable airspace and the minimum
safe altitudes of flight, the court held that a court of equity had the
power to enjoin prospective flights at the dangerously low altitude. The
court based its decision not on any interpretation of navigable airspace,
but on the basis that the repeated low flights constituted a real and present
danger to the landowner's life and property. However, the court admitted
that if it had accepted the view of the Civil Aeronautics Board-that the
airplanes would be operating within the navigable airspace-it would
not have to decide whether a state court could enjoin such a flight because
the pleadings did not indicate that the aircraft necessarily were occupying
the airspace so close to the ground.2 ' Through this deficiency-in pleading
the court avoided the question whether a state court could enjoin the
19 Ibid.
20 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955).
21 Id. at 501.
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flight of an airplane expressly found to be operating within the navigable
airspace, but which was interfering with the landowner's use and enjoy-
ment of his property.
The language of other state courts would imply and infer that if
repeated low flights of aircraft result in an unreasonable interference
with the use of the land or constitute a dangerous condition to the well-
being of those beneath the aircraft, the courts would have the power to
issue restraining orders prohibiting future flights along present flight
patterns nothwithstanding that the aircraft may be operating within the
navigable airspace. 22 Reason indicates the wisdom of this tendency since
the landowner's interests in the safety of his family, himself, and his
property should not be made contingent upon a judicial determination
as to the downward extent of the navigable airspace. To these courts
the extent of the boundaries of the navigable airspace apparently would
make little difference.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has stated that a flight which is dangerous
to a property owner would be an unlawful violation of its regulations
even though the airplane was operating within navigable airspace. This
applies even during take-off or landing. 23 Further, it has been stated that
it is not controlling that the federal government has exclusive control in
the navigable airspace for this policy was not meant to abridge the lawful
rights incident to ownership of land.2 4 Other courts have suggested that
to interpret the minimum safe altitudes regulation of the federal govern-
ment in such a manner as to allow interference with recognized property
rights would be to give the regulation a strained and unnatural con-
struction. 25
Apparently all of the authorities seem to agree the safety of the land-
owner is paramount, and if repeated low flights of an airplane constitute
a nuisance rather than a mere inconvenience, relief will be given regard-
less of the position of the airplane relative to navigable airspace.
Trespass
The landowner may couple with his complaint of nuisance a general
allegation of trespass which also results from the repeated low flight of
an aircraft over his property. Various theories have arisen as to whether
22 Barrier v. Troutman, 231 N.C. 47, 55 S.E.2d 923 (1949); Reynolds v. Wilson,
67 Pa. D. & C. 286 (1949); Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, 196 P.2d 464(1948); Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, 1 N.J. Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645 (1948);
Dlugas v. United Air Lines, 53 Pa. D. & C. 402 (1944); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey,
193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942); Vanderslice v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27
A.2d 87 (1942).
23 Gardner v. County of Allegheny, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491, 502 (1955). The
applicable general flight rule is: "§ 60.12 Careless or reckless operation. No person
shall operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life
or property of others." An explanatory note specifies examples of operations which
could endanger the lives or property of others: "Any person who 'buzzes', dives
on, or flies in close proximity to a farm, home, any structure, vehicle, vessel, or group
of persons on the ground." 14 C.F.R. § 60.12 (1956).
24 Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal.2d 825, 243 P.2d 497, 506 (1952).
25 Gay v. Taylor, 19 Pa. D. & C. 31, 36 (1932); Smith v. New England Air-
craft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 392 (1930); cf. Warren Twp. School
Dist. No. 7 v. Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N.W.2d 134 (1944).
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an airplane is trespassing over the lands of adjacent property owners
when landing or taking off at an airport.26 It is beyond the scope of this
Note to discuss the merits of these theories. It should not make any
difference to a state court subscribing to any one of these several views
which interpretation of the minimum safe altitudes regulation it will
follow when confronted with an allegation of trespass. If the landowner
does not allege in his complaint that the flight of the airplane is so low
as to constitute an actual interference with his possession or beneficial
use of the soil, but merely brings a general allegation that the very pre-
sence of the airplane in the airspace'above his property constitutes a
trespass per se, adherence by the court to either interpretation of the
regulation defining the downward extent of the navigable airspace will
have the same effect.
If the state court accepts the Civil Aeronautics Board's interpretation,
that the navigable airspace extends downward along the angle of
travel of the airplane as it lands or takes off, then neither the aviator
nor his passengers would be trespassers since every citizen of the United
States is recognized as having a public right of transit through the
navigable airspace.27 If the court follows the interpretation of the
Supreme Court-that the airplane would be without the navigable air-
space during such operations-it would be difficult to understand how
the aviator or his passengers could be classified as trespassers. Inasmuch as
the airplane necessarily must fly through non-navigable airspace-under
the Supreme Court's interpretation, the first 1,000 feet of airspace above
the airport would be non-navigable-such a finding appears unreasonable,
although it has been pointed out that the passage of the airplane in this
non-navigable airspace may constitute a technical trespass.28
But adjoining landowners will not merely allege a general complaint
of trespass. They will specifically complain the flights are so low as to
result in an actual interference or invasion of their soil and either demand
damages or an order restraining future flights over their property along
the present glide pattern. Again, in the face of such a complaint, it ap-
parently makes little difference which interpretation of the minimum safe
altitudes regulation regarding the boundaries of the navigable airspace a
state court accepts. Once a court determines that the repeated flights
would be so low as to invade the airspace necessary for the beneficial use
or possession of the soil, thereby constituting a trespass, relief will be
granted the injured property owner. Although the courts do not expressly
say so, it is inferred this result would be reached whether or not the air-
plane is operating within the navigable airspace.
29
Just as in the nuisance situations, the courts do not buttress their
decisions with a determination of the downward extent of navigable
26 RHYNE, AnIPORTS AND THE COURTS 154-63 (1944).
27 52 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 403 (1952). "There is recognized and de-
clared to exist in behalf of any citizen of the United States a public right of
freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable air space of the United
States."
28 Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575, 579 (1942).
29 Gardner v. County of Allegheny, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955); Burn-
ham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942); cf. Warren
Twp. School Dist. No. 7 v. Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N.W.2d 134 (1944).
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airspace, but wisely observe the effects of the frequent low flights on the
landowner and his property. When the aircraft is considered to be tres-
passing and the landowner is confronted with a condition fraught with
imminent peril, the courts will enjoin the repetition of similar flights
regardless of the altitude and airspace involved.
30
"Taking"
There is yet another action available to the landowner whose interests
in the use and enjoyment of property are impaired by low-flying military
aircraft. Previously he was limited to such actions as negligence,
nuisance, and trespass. But these have been extended to include "taking"
which entitles the landowner to compensation from the federal govern-
ment for a servitude imposed upon his land through the low flights
of military airplanes over his property under the provisions of the fifth
amendment.
Relief for a "taking" was first sought in United States v. Causby,3 '
where the landowner brought suit against the United States for an
alleged "taking" by the government of his home and chicken farm which
were located next to a government airfield. His contention was that the
frequent low flights of the military aircraft in using the airfield consti-
tuted the "taking" of his property. The Supreme Court held the
government had taken an easement of airspace because the flights were
"so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference
with the enjoyment and use of the land."'3 2
The question now arises whether a landowner, suffering the same
invasion of his rights as the property owner in Causby, could maintain
an action for a "taking" not against the federal government, but against
one of the political sub-divisions of a state. An increasing number of
airports are owned by either municipal or county governments and are
operated as commercial air terminals through leases of facilities to
airline companies; therefore, the municipal or county government would
be a proper defendant in the action. The Causby case would not be
controlling because it concerned military aircraft and a military operated
airport; furthermore, there is an express prohibition against the taking
of private property for public use without just compensation contained
in the fifth amendment which is intended solely as a limitation on the fed-
eral government.33 However, today all states either by a specific provision
in their constitutions, 34 by statutes,3 5 or by decisions of their highest
30 Ibid.
31 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
32 Id. at 266.
33 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 250-51 (1833). "We are of
opinion, that the provision in the fifth amendment to the constitution, declaring
that private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation,
is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of
the United States, and is not applicable to the ... states."
34 Forty-five states have such provisions, See e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14;
N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 7; PA. CONST. art I, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 24.
35 Although the constitution in Kansas is silent with respect to this right which
appears in the United States Constitution, Kansas affords the same protection to
private landowners by statute. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 26-202 (1949).
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court36 provide that private property cannot be taken for public use
without just compensation. Thus it would appear that a property owner
suffering from the identical conditions imposedupon his land by com-
mercial aircraft, rather than military, which operate from a county
or municipally owned airport, rather than from a military airfield,
as those imposed on the landowner in Causby would be able to maintain
an action for a "taking" against a county or a municipality although, to
date, no such result has been reached by the courts.
In an action for a "taking" should it make any difference whether
the airplanes are operating within or without the navigable airspace at
the time of the alleged taking? In Causby the Court rejected the
government's interpretation of the minimum flight regulations defining
the downward extent of the navigable airspace and formulated its own
interpretation which has been alluded to throughout this Note.37 As a
result the Court found the planes were not operating within the navigable
airspace and awarded damages for a "taking" of private property. One
can only speculate whether the same decision would have been rendered
if the Court, instead of formulating its own interpretation of the minimum
safe altitudes regulation prescribing the boundaries of the navigable air-
space, had adopted the interpretation of the government which placed
the offending aircraft within the navigable airspace. The Court would
then have to decide whether there could be a "taking" of private property
by low-flying aircraft operating within airspace over which control is
vested in the federal government..
However, Gardner v. County of Allegheny,38 in holding that a court
of equity could not assess damages for a "taking," does not foreclose
the possibility of recovering damages when the flights are so low and
so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the use
and enjoyment of the land notwithstanding the flights may have been
within the navigable airspace.39 Even the government on oral argument
in the Causby case conceded that flights so low and so frequent so as
to render property uninhabitable would be a "taking." The Court agreed
that under these conditions this conclusion would follow. 40 These latter
two statements, when viewed in the background of the government's
main contention that the military aircraft were operating within the
navigable airspace, are extremely noteworthy. They indicate that a
determination of the boundaries of the navigable airspace is unimportant
and subordinate to a determination that the low flight of an airplane
interferes unreasonably with the use of the landowner's soil. For once
36 The Supreme Courts of North Carolina and New Hampshire have held that
private property cannot be taken for public use without reasonable compensation.
Yancey v. North Carolina St. Highway & Pub. Wks. Comm'n, 222 N.C. 106, 22 S.E.
2d 256 (1942); Goodrich Falls Elec. Co. v. Howard, 86 N.H. 512, 171 A. 761(1934).
37 See note 17 supra.
38 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955).
39 114A.2d at 505.
40 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946). However, the Court stated that the use and enjoy-
ment does not have to be completely destroyed before there can be a "taking." It
will be sufficient if the use of the airspace immediately above the land limits the
utility of the land or causes a diminution in its value. Id. at 262.
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it appears to the court's satisfaction that the interference has been so sub-
stantial as to impose a servitude upon the landowner, compensation can
be awarded for a "taking" regardless of the status of the airplane as
to navigable airspace.
State and Municipal Regulation of Air Commerce
Undoubtedly, the importance of the two theories defining the
boundaries of navigable airspace becomes most significant when regula-
tions controlling the flight of ariplanes, which are in direct conflict with
those issued by the federal government through the Civil Aeronautics
Board, are promulgated by a state or one of its political sub-divisions.
Whether or not the state courts will give effect to these regulations may
well depend upon which airspace-navigable or non-navigable-is being
regulated by the state or municipal governments. For example, in
Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst,41 a village board enacted
an ordinance which prohibited flights below 1,000 feet within the village
boundaries. The ordinance was aimed specifically at those aircraft using
Idlewild field since the village was located within one mile of that airport.
Because enforcement of the ordinance would seriously impair the
operation of the airport (the approach to one of its major runways is
directly over the village), interested parties brought suit to have the
ordinance declared invalid. The court struck down the ordinance and
supported its decision by a determination that Congress has pre-empted
the power of regulation and control of aircraft; therefore, municipal
governments, including states, are precluded from enacting contrary
or conflicting legislation.4 2 It should be noted that the case did not
concern the rights of adjoining landowners; 43 thus the questions of
nuisance, trespass, or "taking" were not in issue. The court accepted
as controlling the Civil Aeronautics Board's interpretation that the
airplanes were operating within navigable airspace as they flew over the
village, and concluded that since the federal government had regulated
air traffic in this airspace to such a marked degree, it barred through
pre-emption any further regulation of this airspace by the state or
municipal governments.
The question arises as to whether the court would have invalidated the
ordinance if it had accepted the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
downward extent of navigable airspace instead of the Civil Aeronautics
Board's. The court could not turn to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
for its authority to strike down the ordinance because the act only
provides for regulation of air traffic in the navigable airspace4 4 and,
under the interpretation of the Supreme Court, the airplanes would be
operating without the navigable airspace. However, another element which
the court might consider is that the airplanes must of necessity fly through
41 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), afl'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
42 Id. at 881.
43 "No claim is now made by the defendant that those flights interfered with
the enjoyment of the land beneath." Id. at 879.
44 "It is apparent that Congress, by the enactment of the 1938 Aeronautics
Act, adopted a comprehensive plan for the regulation of air traffic in the navigable
airspace." Id. at 881.
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non-navigable airspace as they move between the surface and the navi-
gable airspace, a result reached under the interpretation of the Supreme
Court; it may be troublesome to have one set of rules regulating altitude
in the navigable airspace as provided by the Civil Air Regulations and
another set regulating altitude in non-navigable airspace as provided by
ordinances similar to that in the Village of Cedarhurst case.
Conclusion
The foregoing decisions and materials illustrate the need for further
clarification of the minimum safe altitudes regulation if the conflict
presently existing as to the downward extent of the navigable airspace
is to be resolved. Perhaps in the not too distant future the dispute will
be determined since the President's Airport Commission has recom-
mended that section 60.17 of the Civil Air Regulations, governing the
use of airspace, should be clarified in view of the diverse interpretations
now imparted to the scope of the phrase "Except when necessary for
take-off or landing."'4 5 Another possible solution would be to change the
language of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 so that the statute specifies
what the status of an airplane would be relative to navigable airspace
when landing or taking off.
Edward N. Denn
45 Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the
Senate, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 818 (1954).
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